There is a need recognized by the National Institute of Dental & Craniofacial Research and the National Cancer Institute to advance basic, translational and clinical saliva research. The goal of the Salivaomics Knowledge Base (SKB) is to create a data management system and web resource constructed to support human salivaomics research. To maximize the utility of the SKB for retrieval, integration and analysis of data, we have developed the Saliva Ontology and SDxMart. This article reviews the informatics advances in saliva (...) diagnostics made possible by the Saliva Ontology and SDxMart. (shrink)

One way to interpret the work of Joshua Greene (2001; 2008; 2014) is that the wave of empirical research into moral decision-making is a way for us to become more confident in our ability to gain moral knowledge. We argue that empirical research into moral judgment has shown (both survey-based and brain-based) that the grounds of moral judgment are opaque on several dimensions. We argue that we cannot firmly grasp what the morally relevant/irrelevant features of a decision context are, understand (...) which cognitive system responds to said features, and further know that we are actually basing our judgment upon what we take to be the morally relevant features. That is, we argue that moral judgment is very much like other kinds of judgment: Deeply influenced by facts about the decision-context and the decision-maker. However, if moral judgment is merely the exercise of our general judgment making faculty, we shouldn’t be surprised by this result. We conclude by considering what this means for our practice of making moral judgments. (shrink)

An experiment was performed to test the hypothesis that people sometimes take physical actions to make themselves more effective problem solvers. The task was to generate all possible words that could be formed from seven Scrabble letters. In one condition, participants could use their hands to manipulate the letters, and in another condition, they could not. Results show that more words were generated with physical manipulation than without. However, an interaction was obtained between the physical manipulation conditions and the specific (...) letter sets chosen, indicating that physical manipulation helps more for generating words in some circumstances than in others. Overall, our findings can be explained in terms of an interactive search process in which external, physical activity effectively complements internal, cognitive activity. Within this framework, the interaction can be explained in terms of the relative difficulty of generating words from the letters given in the different sets. (shrink)

Graduates' employability indicates the excellent education and relevant preparation they obtained from their respective degrees. Tracer studies have enabled higher education institutions to profile their graduates while also reflecting on the quality of education they provide. With the foregoing, a tracer study determined the demographic and academic profile of teacher education graduates from 2017 to 2020 in a state university in the West Philippines. It also ascertained the advanced studies they attended after college, their employment data, the relevance of college (...) preparation with their current employment, difficulties they encountered while securing employment and in their present job, and recommendations to strengthen the teacher education program. The study utilized a descriptive survey research design with 80 non-random samples chosen based on availability. The survey was based on the Philippine Commission on Higher Education with modifications elucidated from previous studies. Results showed that graduates took the teacher education program with a strong passion for the teaching profession. More graduates received honors and awards, passed the licensure examinations for teachers, attended advanced studies for professional development, and are employable. Besides, the graduates’ college preparation is relevant to their current employment. Further, difficulties and problems encountered and recommendations to strengthen the teacher education program were noted. These findings may serve as a baseline for curriculum review and give suggestions for future tracer studies. (shrink)

There is growing interest in the use of technology to enhance the tracking and quality of clinical information available for patients in disaster settings. This paper describes the design and evaluation of the Wireless Internet Information System for Medical Response in Disasters (WIISARD).

Virtual environment landmarks are essential in wayfinding: they anchor routes through a region and provide memorable destinations to return to later. Current virtual environment browsers provide user interface menus that characterize available travel destinations via landmark textual descriptions or thumbnail images. Such characterizations lack the depth cues and context needed to reliably recognize 3D landmarks. This paper introduces a new user interface affordance that captures a 3D representation of a virtual environment landmark into a 3D thumbnail, called a worldlet. Each (...) worldlet is a miniature virtual world fragment that may be interactively viewed in 3D, enabling a traveler to gain first-person experience with a travel destination. In a pilot student conducted to compare textual, image, and worldlet landmark representations within a wayfinding task, worldlet use significantly reduced the overall travel time and distance traversed, virtually eliminating unnecessary backtracking. (shrink)

Dramatic advances in 3D Web technologies have recently led to widespread development of virtual world Web browsers and 3D content. A natural question is whether 3D thumbnails can be used to find one’s way about such 3D content the way that text and 2D thumbnail images are used to navigate 2D Web content. We have conducted an empirical experiment that shows interactive 3D thumbnails, which we call worldlets, improve travelers’ landmark knowledge and expedite wayfinding in virtual environments.

In this article, we propose the Fair Priority Model for COVID-19 vaccine distribution, and emphasize three fundamental values we believe should be considered when distributing a COVID-19 vaccine among countries: Benefiting people and limiting harm, prioritizing the disadvantaged, and equal moral concern for all individuals. The Priority Model addresses these values by focusing on mitigating three types of harms caused by COVID-19: death and permanent organ damage, indirect health consequences, such as health care system strain and stress, as well as (...) economic destruction. It proposes proceeding in three phases: the first addresses premature death, the second long-term health issues and economic harms, and the third aims to contain viral transmission fully and restore pre-pandemic activity. -/- To those who may deem an ethical framework irrelevant because of the belief that many countries will pursue "vaccine nationalism," we argue such a framework still has broad relevance. Reasonable national partiality would permit countries to focus on vaccine distribution within their borders up until the rate of transmission is below 1, at which point there would not be sufficient vaccine-preventable harm to justify retaining a vaccine. When a government reaches the limit of national partiality, it should release vaccines for other countries. -/- We also argue against two other recent proposals. Distributing a vaccine proportional to a country's population mistakenly assumes that equality requires treating differently situated countries identically. Prioritizing countries according to the number of front-line health care workers, the proportion of the population over 65, and the number of people with comorbidities within each country may exacerbate disadvantage and end up giving the vaccine in large part to wealthy nations. (shrink)

The self-fashioning of French Newtonianism Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9511-3 Authors Charles T. Wolfe, Unit for History and Philosophy of Science, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia David Gilad, Unit for History and Philosophy of Science, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

Musical works change. Bruckner revised his Eighth Symphony. Ella Fitzgerald and many other artists have made it acceptable to sing the jazz standard “All the Things You Are” without its original verse. If we accept that musical works genuinely change in these ways, a puzzle arises: why can’t I change Bruckner’s Eighth Symphony? More generally, why are some individuals in a privileged position when it comes to changing musical works and other artifacts, such as novels, films, and games? I give (...) a view of musical works that helps to answer these questions. Musical works, on this view, are created abstract objects with no parts. The paradigmatic changes that musical works undergo are socially determined normative changes in how they should be performed. Due to contingent social practices, Bruckner, but not I, can change how his symphony should be performed. Were social practices radically different, I would be able to change his symphony. This view extends to abstract artifacts beyond music, including novels, films, words, games, and corporations. (shrink)

According to dispositionalism about modality, a proposition <p> is possible just in case something has, or some things have, a power or disposition for its truth; and <p> is necessary just in case nothing has a power for its falsity. But are there enough powers to go around? In Yates (2015) I argued that in the case of mathematical truths such as <2+2=4>, nothing has the power to bring about their falsity or their truth, which means they come out both (...) necessary and not possible. Combining this with axiom (T), it is easy to derive a contradiction. I suggested that dispositionalists ought to retreat a little and say that <p> is possible just in case either p, or there is a power to bring it about that p, grounding the possibility of mathematical propositions in their truth rather than in powers. Vetter’s (2015) has the resources to provide a response to my argument, and in her (2018) she explicitly addresses it by arguing for a plenitude of powers, based on the idea that dispositions come in degrees, with necessary properties a limiting case of dispositionality. On this view there is a power for <2+2=4>, without there being a power to bring about its truth. In this paper I argue that Vetter’s case for plenitude does not work. However, I suggest, if we are prepared to accept metaphysical causation, a case can be made that there is indeed a power for <2+2=4>. (shrink)

Her din ve mistik kültürde ortaya çıkan dinî tecrübelerin felsefe, kelam ve fıkıh gibi bilim alanlarında farklı açıklamaları yapılmış, akli olup olmadığı sorgulanmıştır. Vahiy, keramet, vecd, hulul, tecelli gibi kavramlara açıklamalar getirilmiştir. Fakat bu tür tecrübelerin insanın fizyolojik ve psikolojik mekanizmalarıyla ne tür bir bağlantısı olduğu İslam düşünce geleneğinde pek tartışılmamıştır. Bu tür tecrübe yaşayan kişilerin sorunlu olup olmadığı tıbbi açıdan değerlendirilmemiştir. Dini tecrübeleri tıbbî bir sorun olarak ele alıp bu tecrübeleri ‘deney’ konusu yaparak inceleyen ilk düşünür William James’tir (ö.1910). (...) O, The Varieties of Religious Experience adlı kitabında her türlü ‘dini’ olarak ifade edilen tecrübeleri ele alıp açıkladığı gibi, dini olmayan ama dini tecrübelere benzer mistik tecrübeleri de araştırıp, incelemiştir. Fakat James, araştırmasında dini ve mistik tecrübe ayırımı yapmamıştır. İkili bir ayırma tabi tutulmadan bütün tecrübelerin tek bir başlık altında incelenip ‘psikolojik durum’ olarak kabul edilmesi bu bildirinin ele aldığı ana sorundur. Bütün tecrübeler tek bir başlık altında ele alınırsa peygamberlerin tecrübeleri (vahiy) ile bunun dışında yer alan mistik tecrübelerin (vecd, keramet) bir farkı kalmayacaktır. Bu ikisini ayırmak için akli kriterleri ve tecrübelerinin ana iddialarını değerlendirip ele almak gerekir. Vahiy tecrübelerinin temel iddialarıyla mistik tecrübelerin iddialarını karşılaştırdığımızda vahiy tecrübelerinin akli kriterlere uygun olduğu ve tıbbi açıdan hastalıklı bir insanın tecrübesi olmadığı görülecektir. Mistik tecrübeler de ise durum bunun tersi görünmektedir. Mistik tecrübeler geçirenlerin çoğu zaman depresyon, manik ve çoğu zaman da uyuşturucu ile ortaya çıktığı, bunalımlı ve savaş dönemlerinde bu tür tecrübelerin arttığı görülür. Bu şekilde vahiy tecrübesinin doğruluğu ortaya konduğunda toplumu etkileyen dini inançların doğru kaynağına yönelmek mümkün olur. Mistik tecrübelerin ise hastalıklı zihnin ürünü olması nedeniyle insanları saptırıcı, dinden çıkarıcı ve akıl dışı olduğu ortaya çıkar. Bu şekilde dini inançların istikameti doğru bir şekilde çizilmiş olur. (shrink)

This thesis brings together two concerns. The first is the nature of inference—what it is to infer—where inference is understood as a distinctive kind of conscious and self-conscious occurrence. The second concern is the possibility of doxastic agency. To be capable of doxastic agency is to be such that one is capable of directly exercising agency over one’s beliefs. It is to be capable of exercising agency over one’s beliefs in a way which does not amount to mere self-manipulation. Subjects (...) who can exercise doxastic agency can settle questions for themselves. A challenge to the possibility of doxastic agency stems from the fact that we cannot believe or come to believe “at will”, where this in turn seems to be so because belief “aims at truth”. It must be explained how we are capable of doxastic agency despite that we cannot believe or come to believe at will. On the orthodox ‘causalist’ conception of inference for an inference to occur is for one act of acceptance to cause another in some specifiable “right way”. This conception of inference prevents its advocates from adequately seeing how reasoning could be a means to exercise doxastic agency, as it is natural to think it is. Suppose, for instance, that one reasons and concludes by inferring where one’s inference yields belief in what one infers. Such an inference cannot be performed at will. We cannot infer at will when inference yields belief any more than we can believe or come to believe at will. When it comes to understanding the extent to which one could be exercising agency in such a case the causalist conception of inference suggests that we must look to the causal history of one’s concluding act of acceptance, the nature of the act’s being determined by the way in which it is caused. What results is a picture on which such reasoning as a whole cannot be action. We are at best capable of actions of a kind which lead causally to belief fixation through “mental ballistics”. The causalist account of inference, I argue, is in fact either inadequate or unmotivated. It either fails to accommodate the self-consciousness of inference or is not best placed to play the very explanatory role which it is put forward to play. On the alternative I develop when one infers one’s inference is the conscious event which is one’s act of accepting that which one is inferring. The act’s being an inference is determined, not by the way it is caused, but by the self-knowledge which it constitutively involves. This corrected understanding of inference renders the move from the challenge to the possibility of doxastic agency to the above ballistics picture no longer tempting. It also yields an account of how we are capable of exercising doxastic agency by reasoning despite being unable to believe or come to believe at will. In order to see how such reasoning could amount to the exercise of doxastic agency it needs to be conceived of appropriately. I suggest that paradigm reasoning which potentially amounts the exercise of doxastic agency ought to be conceived of as primarily epistemic agency—agency the aim of which is knowledge. With inference conceived as suggested, I argue, it can be seen how to engage in such reasoning can just be to successfully exercise such agency. (shrink)

Pain asymbolia is a rare condition caused by brain damage, usually in adulthood. Asymbolics feel pain but appear indifferent to it, and indifferent also to visual and verbal threats. How should we make sense of this? Nikola Grahek thinks asymbolics’ pains are abnormal, lacking a component that make normal pains unpleasant and motivating. Colin Klein thinks that what is abnormal is not asymbolics’ pains, but asymbolics: they have a psychological deficit making them unresponsive to unpleasant pain. I argue that an (...) illuminating account requires elements of both views. Asymbolic pains are indeed abnormal, but they are abnormal because asymbolics are. I agree with Klein that asymbolics are incapable of caring about their bodily integrity; but I argue against him that, if this is to explain not only their indifference to visual and verbal threat, but also their indifference to pain, we must do the following: (i) take asymbolics’ lack of bodily care not as an alternative to, but as an explanation of their pains’ missing a component, and (ii) claim that the missing component consists in evaluative content. Asymbolia, I conclude, reveals not only that unpleasant pain is composite, but that its ‘hedomotive component’ is evaluative. (shrink)

We start by presenting three different views that jointly imply that every person has many conscious beings in their immediate vicinity, and that the number greatly varies from person to person. We then present and assess an argument to the conclusion that how confident someone should be in these views should sensitively depend on how massive they happen to be. According to the argument, sometimes irreducibly de se observations can be powerful evidence for or against believing in metaphysical theories.

This article critically investigates the landscape of contemporary philosophical hermeneutics, especially Gadamerian hermeneutics. This investigation reveals that one of the central trends in recent decades has been to construe hermeneutics as, instead of an ongoing and substantive philosophical research project, rather an amorphous current or nebulous spirit of intellectual life and culture—what this article refers to as the sense of hermeneutics as an attitude. The “effective history” of this characterization of hermeneutics is traced to polemical references to hermeneutics by Alain (...) Badiou and Richard Rorty, which have negatively contributed to the reception of the hermeneutical movement. The article suggests that hermeneutics should aim to be neither a vague sensibility nor, in what ultimately amounts to a reaction against the idea of hermeneutics as an attitude, a rigorous “method” of interpretation, but rather an ongoing philosophical research program. To unpack this suggestion, the article concludes by providing “foundations for a contemporary hermeneutics” with reference to six contributions from promising recent work in hermeneutics. (shrink)

Platonists affirm the existence of abstract mathematical objects, and Nominalists deny the existence of abstract mathematical objects. While there are standard arguments in favor of Nominalism, these arguments fail to account for the necessity of Nominalism. Furthermore, these arguments do nothing to explain why Nominalism is true. They only point to certain theoretical vices that might befall the Platonist. The goal of this paper is to formulate and defend a simple, valid argument for the necessity of Nominalism that seeks to (...) precisify the widespread intuition that mathematical objects are somehow ‘spooky’ or ‘mysterious’. (shrink)

We call attention to certain cases of epistemic akrasia, arguing that they support belief-credence dualism. Belief-credence dualism is the view that belief and credence are irreducible, equally fundamental attitudes. Consider the case of an agent who believes p, has low credence in p, and thus believes that they shouldn’t believe p. We argue that dualists, as opposed to belief-firsters (who say credence reduces to belief) and credence-firsters (who say belief reduces to credence) can best explain features of akratic cases, including (...) the observation that akratic beliefs seem to be held despite possessing a defeater for those beliefs, and that, in akratic cases, one can simultaneously believe and have low confidence in the very same proposition. (shrink)

After the death of Mevlana Celaleddin-i Rumi (d.1273), the cult of Mevlevi continued its structuring. Rumi's son Sultan Veled (d.1312) and his grandson Ulu Arif Çelebi (d.1320) contributed greatly to this structuring. Sultan Veled tried to turn the lodge he took over from his father into a systematic sect around Rumi's mystical thought and Mevlevi disciples. Ulu Arif Çelebi, on the other hand, is a very effective name in organizing Mevleviism as a cult. With his systematic studies and travels, he (...) made Mevlevi's spread in lodges and madrasahs, and he made efforts to teach Masnavi, the work of his grandfather Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi, in madrasahs. In addition, Ulu Arif Çelebi asked Ahmet Eflakî to write a book called Ariflerin Menkıbeleri about Rumi’s life, in order to keep his grandfather's memory alive. The entry of Mevlevi into the Ottoman State was through marriage. Mutahhare Hatun, daughter of Sultan Veled, was married to Süleyman Şah, the Germiyanoğulları leader. Süleyman Şah married the daughter of this marriage, Devlet Hatun, to Yıldırım Beyazıt, and left as a dowry Kütahya, Tavsanlı, Simav and Eğrigöz to Ottoman Empire. Yıldırım Bayezıd was appointed as the governor of Kütahya. Mehmet Çelebi was born from this marriage. The title of Çelebi is a title given to the descendants of Rumi, and Mehmet Çelebi, one of the sultans of the Fetret Period (A period of great depression), was one of the grandchildren of Rumi. The children of Mehmet Çelebi are remembered with the title of 'Çelebi'. Through this marriage, Mevlevi began to spread to the Ottoman Empire. Thus, Mevleviism would prevail in the Ottoman Empire, where Ahilik organization and Ahi culture prevailed, and Mevlevihane and Asitane would be established in many parts of the country with the support of the Ottoman State. Mevlana Celaleddin-i Rumi’nin (ö.1273) ölümünden sonra Mevlevilik bir tarikat olarak yapılanmasını sürdürmüştür. Mevlana’nın oğlu Sultan Veled’in (ö.1312) ve torunu Ulu Arif Çelebi’nin (ö.1320) bu yapılanmada katkısı oldukça büyüktür. Sultan Veled babasından devraldığı dergâhı, Mevlana’nın mistik düşüncesi çerçevesinde ve Mevlevi müritler etrafında sistemli bir tarikat haline getirmeye çalışmıştır. Ulu Arif Çelebi ise Mevleviliği bir tarikat olarak örgütlemede oldukça etkili bir isimdir. O sistematik olarak yaptığı çalışmalar ve seyahatlerle Mevleviliğin tekke, zaviye ve medreselerde yayılmasını sağladığı gibi dedesi Mevlana Celaleddin ’in eseri Mesnevi’nin medreselerde okutulması için de çaba sarf etmiştir. Ayrıca Ulu Arif Çelebi, dedesinin hatırasını canlı tutabilmek Ahmet Eflaki adındaki bir yazıcıya Mevlana’nın hayatını yazdırmıştır. (Ariflerin Menkıbeleri kitabı) Mevleviliğin Osmanlı Devleti’ne girişi evlilik yoluyla olmuştur. Sultan Veled’in kızı Mutahhare Hatun, Germiyanoğulları Beyi Süleyman Şah ile evlidir. Süleyman Şah bu evlilikten olan kızı Devlet Hatun’u Osmanlı Devleti’nin o dönem şehzadesi olan Yıldırım Beyazıt ile evlendirmiş ve çeyiz olarak Kütahya, Tavşanlı, Simav ve Eğrigöz dolaylarını Osmanlılara bırakmıştır. Yıldırım Bayezıd ise Kütahya valiliğine getirilmiştir. Bu evlilikten Mehmet Çelebi dünyaya gelmiştir. Çelebi unvanı Mevlana’nın soyundan gelenlere verilen bir unvandır ve Fetret Dönemi padişahlarından olan Mehmet Çelebi, Mevlana’nın torunlarındandır. Mehmet Çelebi’nin çocukları ‘çelebi’ unvanıyla anılmaktadır. Bu evlilik yoluyla Mevlevilik Osmanlı’da yayılmaya başlamıştır. Böylece daha önce Ahilik teşkilatı ve Ahi kültürünün hâkim olduğu Osmanlı Devleti’ne Mevlevilik hâkim olacak ve Osmanlı Devleti’nin desteğiyle ülkenin birçok yerinde Mevlevihane ve Asitane kurulacaktır. (shrink)

"La struttura delle rivoluzioni scientifiche", dopo più di mezzo secolo dalla sua pubblicazione, è ancora in grado di offrire un contributo alla pratica filosofica? In questo articolo, attraverso i concetti peirceani di Abito, Abduzione e Verità, si propone una lettura pragmaticista del testo di Kuhn che intende rilanciare un fecondo confronto, ancora poco considerato, tra i due filosofi.

This is a contribution to the symposium on Tim Scanlon’s Being Realistic about Reasons. We have two aims here: First, we ask for more details about Scanlon’s meta-metaphysical view, showing problems with salient clarifications. And second, we raise independent objections to the view – to its explanatory productivity, its distinctness, and the argumentative support it enjoys.

Beyond Dordt and ‘De Auxiliis’ explores post-Reformation inter-confessional theological exchange on soteriological topics including predestination, grace, and free choice. These doctrines remained controversial within confessional traditions after the Reformation, as Dominicans and Jesuits and later Calvinists and Arminians argued about these critical issues in the Augustinian theological heritage. Some of those involved in condemning Arminianism at the Synod of Dordt (1618-1619) were inspired by Dominican followers of Thomas Aquinas in Spain who had recently opposed the vigorous defense of free choice (...) by Jesuit Molinists in the Congregatio de auxiliis (1598-1607). This volume, appearing on the 400th anniversary of the closing of the Synod of Dordt, brings together a group of scholars working in fields that only rarely speak to one another to address these theological debates that cross geographical and confessional boundaries. (shrink)

Kant’ın (ö.1804) felsefesi eklektik bir felsefedir ve Aydınlanma felsefesinin devamı niteliğindedir. Aydınlanma felsefesine benzer şekilde felsefesinin temeli akıldır ve aklın sınırları ve kullanımı hakkında fikirler ileri sürmüştür. Kant, dini ele alırken Tanrı’nın varlığının saf akılla ispatlanamayacağı sonucuna varmıştır. Çünkü akılla yapılan ispatlarda Tanrı’nın varlığına getirilen deliller kadar yokluğuna da eşit derecede deliller getirilebilir. O nedenle Tanrı’nın varlığının ispatında saf aklın değil pratik aklın önemli olduğunu ve ahlâksal yasaların bizi Tanrı’nın varlığına götüreceğini ileri sürer. Bu görüşünü desteklemek için eserlerinde teistik delillerin (...) akla uygun olmadığını ve akılla bilinemeyeceğini ispatlamaya çalışmıştır. Ona göre ontolojik, kozmolojik, teleolojik.. vb. teistik delillerin işlevi zihni tanrıbilim için hazırlamaktan ibarettir. Fakat tek başına Tanrı’nın varlığını ispat etmekten uzaktır. Ontolojik delili Tanrı’nın varlığının ispatı ile ilgili belli bir felsefi delilin adı olarak kullanan ilk kişi 18.yy. filozoflarından Christian Wolff’tur (ö.1754). Ontolojik delil, diğer deliler gibi ‘olgulara dayalı’ değildir. Bu delil tamamen kavramsal ve a priori önermelere dayanır. Delil, Tanrı’nın doğrudan doğruya ve hiçbir vasıtaya gerek kalmadan bilineceği üzerine kurgulanmıştır. Tanrı’nın mükemmelliği, ‘Tanrı vardır’ önermesinin sadece düşünsel bir önerme mi yoksa dış varlığa karşılık gelen bir önerme mi olduğu, Tanrı’nın varlığının zorunluluğu meselesi ontolojik delil içinde tartışılan konulardır. Ontolojik delilde ‘Tanrı vardır’ önermesi a priori ve analitik bir önerme olarak kabul edilmektedir. Analitik önermeler ise Tanrı’nın varlığının zorunluluğunu gösterir. Kant’ın eleştirisine göre a priori kavramlar yoluyla her şeyi olanaklı düşünebiliriz ve bunun için zihnimizde herhangi bir sınırlama olamaz. Tanrı ve zorunlu varlık kavramlarını zihnimizde düşündüğümüz gibi Anka Kuşu, Kaf dağı, Pamuk Prenses..vb. kavramların da var olduğu düşünülebilir ve bizim düşünmemiz bunları zorunlu yapmaz, tıpkı Tanrı’yı düşündüğümüzde Tanrı’yı zorunlu var kılmadığı gibi. Bu bildiride Kant’ın düşüncesi ortaya konulduktan sonra onun düşüncesindeki tutarlılık ve tutarsızlıklara değinilecektir. Anka Kuşu, Kaf Dağı, Pamuk Prenses ..vb. gibi hayali kavramlarla Tanrı kıyaslanabilir mi? Biz hayali varlıkları zihnimizde oluştururken yine duyu verilerinden yararlanır ve dış dünyada gözlemlediğimiz canlılara benzer ‘hayali varlıklar’ üretiriz. Dış dünyada, kuş, dağ ve prenses vardır. Bizim tek yaptığımız bunu hayali adlar takmaktır. Fakat Tanrı söz konusu olduğunda dış dünyada gözlem yaparak bir Tanrı’ya şahit olmayız ve bu şahit olduğumuz Tanrı’ya benzer bir Tanrı’yı hayal ederek zihnimizde hayali bir varlık oluşturmayız. Tam tersine Tanrı kavramını zihnimizde oluştururken hiçbir şeye benzemeyen, sebebi olmayan, her şeyi varlığa getiren, mükemmel bir varlık çıkarımını akıl ve mantığımızın bizi götürdüğü sonuçla ortaya koyarız. Çünkü insan olarak biz birbirimize benzeriz, bizim bir sebebimiz vardır, hiçbir şey yaratamayız ve mükemmel değilizdir. Ve evrenin sonsuzluğu, yıldızlar, gezegenler, insanın biyolojik yapısı, matematiksel düzen bizi zorunlu olarak ‘sebebi olmayan mükemmel bir sebep’ aramaya iter. Ve Ontolojik Delil ortaya çıkar. Bu bakımdan Kant’ın eleştirisini kabul etmek mümkün değildir. (shrink)

This paper develops and motivates a unification theory of metaphysical explanation, or as I will call it, Metaphysical Unificationism. The theory’s main inspiration is the unification account of scientific explanation, according to which explanatoriness is a holistic feature of theories that derive a large number of explananda from a meager set of explanantia, using a small number of argument patterns. In developing Metaphysical Unificationism, I will point out that it has a number of interesting consequences. The view offers a novel (...) conception of metaphysical explanation that doesn’t rely on the notion of a “determinative” or “explanatory” relation; it allows us to draw a principled distinction between metaphysical and scientific explanations; it implies that naturalness and fundamentality are distinct but intimately related notions; and perhaps most importantly, it re-establishes the unduly neglected link between explanation and understanding in the metaphysical realm. A number of objections can be raised against the view, but I will argue that none of these is conclusive. The upshot is that Metaphysical Unificationism provides a powerful and hitherto overlooked alternative to extant theories of metaphysical explanation. (shrink)

Sometimes the philosophical armchair gets bumped by empirical facts. So it is when thinking about pain. For good or ill (good, actually, as we shall see) most of us are intimately acquainted with physical pain, the kind you feel when you stand on a nail or burn your hand. And, from the armchair, it can seem blindingly obvious that pain is essentially unpleasant. There are of course unpleasant experiences that aren’t pains – nausea or itches, for example – but surely (...) there aren’t pains that don’t hurt, pains that are neutral or even pleasurable rather than unpleasant. Surely, indeed, there couldn’t be. For it is part of the very concept of a pain that a pain be unpleasant. Or so it has seemed to many. Yet over recent decades philosophers’ confidence in these putative truisms has been shaken by some fascinating cases from the clinic, the lab, and life. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to create dialectical space for a hitherto under-discussed option in the philosophy of conspiracy theories. The extant literature on the topic almost exclusively assumes that conspiracy theories are a type of explanation. The typical mental attitude towards explanations is belief, a representational attitude that can be assessed as true, false, warranted or unwarranted. I call models based on this assumption alethic models. Alethic models can’t pick out conspiracy theories as a distinct class of mental (...) attitudes without latching onto their negative epistemic properties. The extant literature therefore finds itself in an unfortunate situation. It either has to presume that conspiracy theories are epistemically defective in general (generalism). Or it has to deny that conspiracy theories are a distinct class of mental attitudes. Conspiracy theories are then nothing more than theories, theories about conspiracies, and should be assessed on a case-by-case basis (particularism). Instead, this paper motivates the research program of narrative models. According to narrative models, conspiracy theories are first and foremost stories – structured fictions. And their relevant mental attitudes are the attitudes of fiction – make-believe and imagination. Fictions are not subjects to epistemic norms. They are neither rational nor irrational. Narrative models can therefore pick out conspiracy theories as a distinct class of mental attitudes without labeling them as defective in general. In addition, they are able to explain certain features of conspiracy discourse particularly well, and they offer new perspectives on the popularity of conspiracy theories and the means of intervention we have at our disposal. (shrink)

The paper investigates what type of motivation can be given for adopting a knowledge-based decision theory. KBDT seems to have several advantages over competing theories of rationality. It is commonly argued that this theory would naturally fit with the intuitive idea that being rational is doing what we take to be best given what we know, an idea often supported by appeal to ordinary folk appraisals. Moreover, KBDT seems to strike a perfect balance between the problematic extremes of subjectivist and (...) objectivist decision theory. We argue that these alleged advantages do not stand up to a closer scrutiny: KBDT inherits the same kinds of problems as alternative decision theoretic frameworks but doesn’t retain any of the respective advantages. Moreover, differently from other knowledge-action principles advanced in the literature, KBDT cannot fully explain the intuitive connections between knowledge and rational action. We conclude that the most serious challenge for knowledge-based decision theorists is to provide a substantive rationale for the adoption of such a view. (shrink)

Nurettin Topçu (1909-1975) built religious philosophy on the philosophy of willpower and motion. For him, willpower is the existence of a conscious balance between driving and braking forces that are innate and flowing from the inside out of us. Willpower is constantly rising towards God and infinity with a historical motion. The aim of willpower is to help human reach eternity. This historical motion occurs in accordance with certain steps. Willpower is affected not only by individual habits and passions but (...) also by the social structure. The function of willpower for humans, who are longing for eternity, is to make them recognize the consciousness and anguish of God. With this awareness, the human moves on to the motion. The willpower, which realizes the direction and aim of the motion, emerges in social structures such as State and nation, and takes up the role of establishing and sustaining these structures. Willpower lastly shows itself in art. The artist, who longs for eternity and can’t find a way to reach it, feels the lack in his willpower, acts to complete the lack and gets engaged in an existence or a thing. This engagement is a savior illusion and love that means sheltering someone other than himself with his total willpower is born. Upon the completion of this lacking, faith (love) emerges. The spirit falls in love with motion. Faith has two dimensions. When the artist turns to ‘the only” and “the internal”, this is called religious faith. If he leans to/relies on/believes in plurality and the external, this is called aesthetical faith. When, in time, the body that leans to the external and the spirit that turns to the internal surrenders to the eternity, the transcendent, God as a whole, mystic faith occurs. ‘Truth’ rises from this mystic union and surrender to love and thereby renaissance initiates. Because the driving power that starts renaissance is art. The understanding of religious experience of Topçu is nested with art. As art generates religious experience, renaissance emerges as a result of religious experience and the human reaches salvation in every sense. (shrink)

The question of whether Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) justifies the existence of metaphysical indeterminacy has recently come to the fore. Metaphysical indeterminacy has been argued to emerge from three sources: coherent superpositions, the indefinite number of branches in the quantum multiverse and the nature of these branches. This paper reviews the evidence and concludes that those arguments don’t rely on EQM alone and rest on metaphysical auxiliary assumptions that transcend the physics of EQM. We show how EQM can be ontologically (...) interpreted without positing metaphysical indeterminacy by adopting a deflationary attitude towards branches. Two ways of developing the deflationary view are then proposed: one where branches are eliminated, and another where they are reduced to the universal quantum state. (shrink)

Priority Theory is an increasingly popular view in metaphysics. By seeing metaphysical questions as primarily concerned with what explains what, instead of merely what exists, it promises not only an interesting approach to traditional metaphysical issues but also the resolution of some outstanding disputes. In a recent paper, Louis deRosset argues that Priority Theory isn’t up to the task: Priority Theory is committed to there being explanations that violate a formal constraint on any adequate explanation. This paper critically examines deRosset’s (...) challenge to Priority Theory. We argue that deRosset’s challenge ultimately fails: his proposed constraint on explanation is neither well-motivated nor a general constraint. Nonetheless, lurking behind his criticism is a deep problem for prominent ways of developing Priority Theory, a problem which we develop. (shrink)

Abstract:Skepticism about grounding is the view that ground-theoretic concepts shouldn’t be used in meta­physical theorizing. Possible reasons for adopting this attitude are numerous: perhaps grounding is unintelligible; or perhaps it’s never instantiated; or perhaps it’s just too heterogeneous to be theor­­­­­etically useful. Unfortunately, as currently pursued the debate between grounding enthusiasts and skeptics is insufficiently structured. This paper’s purpose is to impose a measure of conceptual rigor on the debate by offering an opinionated taxonomy of views with a reasonable claim (...) to being “skeptical.” I argue that carving up logical space into pro- and anti-grounding views isn’t especially helpful; rather, we should recognize various degrees of ground-theoretic involvement depending on how inflationary our understanding of the theoretical term ‘ground’ is. (shrink)

Öz David Hume İnsan Doğası Üzerine Bir İnceleme’de ben idesinin bilgikuramsal temellerini araştırırken, bir yandan hiç kuşku duyulmaksızın kabul edilen ben’e ilişkin bilgimizin güvenilir temellere dayanmadığını göstermeye çalışıyor, diğer yandan da bu tür bir araştırmanın ancak bir bilim aracılığıyla yapılması gereğine dikkat çekiyordu. Ben idesi için görgül kanıt arayışı, oluşturmaya çalıştığı insan biliminin deneysel temelleri olması gerektiği gibi insan doğasına ilişkin araştırmalar için yeni bir uslamlamayı da imliyordu. Hume’un önerdiği uslamlama yöntemi, geleneksel felsefenin insan zihnine dair yaklaşımının artık savunulamaz (...) olduğunun bir göstergesidir. Bu yazıda Hume’un ben idesi öğretisini oluştururken, zihinsel etkinlikleri doğal bir süreç içerisinde kalarak açıklama girişimi irdelenecek, ortaya koyduğu kavramsal ve ilkesel yeniliklerin günümüzde bilişsel bilimler olarak tanımlanan alanın doğuşunda etkili olduğu savunulacaktır. Bu amaçla, ben idesinin oluşumundaki bilgi kuramsal temeller, kişi-özdeşliği öğretisine ve bu tür bir özdeşliği düşünmemizi olanaklı kılan belleğin rolüne dikkat çekerek çözümlenecektir. -/- Abstract While Hume investigates the epistemological basis of the idea of self in his book 'A Treatise of Human Nature', on the one hand he tries to show that our knowledge about the self that is accepted without any doubt does not have reliable basis, on the other hand he draws our attention that any research in this field should be conducted through a science. The search for the emprical evidence for the idea of self is both required for the experimental basis of the newly formed human sciences, and implies a new reasoning for the researches concerning the human nature. Hume’s method of reasoning indicates that the approaches of the traditional philosophy concerning human mind are no longer tenable. In this paper it is examined that while Hume establishes the doctrine of the idea of self, he attempts to explain the mental activities remaining in a natural course, and it is argued that Hume’s epoch-making conceptual and principal contributions in this area have an undeniable impact upon the cognitive sciences of our age. Thus, the epistemological basis of the formation of the idea of self will be analysed by drawing our attention to the personal identity and to memory which makes possible to think such an identity. (shrink)

What is knowledge? What should knowledge be like? Call an epistemological project that sets out to answer the first question ‘descriptive’ and a project that sets out to answer the second question ‘normative’. If the answers to these two questions don’t coincide—if what knowledge should be like differs from what knowledge is like—there is room for a third project we call ‘revisionary’. A revisionary project starts by arguing that what knowledge should be differs from what knowledge is. It then proposes (...) that we revise our account of knowledge accordingly. Our aim in this paper was to develop a methodology for revisionary projects in epistemology. Put roughly, the thought is that we start by looking at the various things that we expect knowledge to do for us. Once we have a list of the various things we expect knowledge to do for us we have a ‘job description’; a list of tasks we need done, and that we expect knowledge to perform. With the job description in hand, we can ask what knowledge would hav.. (shrink)

I offer a novel conception of the nature of wanting. According to it, wanting is lacking something one needs. Lacking is not a normative notion but needing is, and that is how goodness figures in to wanting. What a thing needs derives from what it is to be a good thing of its kind. In people, wanting is connected to both knowledge and the will. A person can know that she wants something and can act on that knowledge. When she (...) does, she is acting in light of that want and her want is a reason why she acted. There is a close connection between wanting and our wills, not just because we can sometimes choose how to get what we need, but because our choices can determine what we want. We can't simply choose to want something, but in deciding how to live our lives, who to be, and what to pursue, we are free to settle what we want, at least within limits. These connections to knowledge and the will make human wanting rich and morally relevant, but they don't transform human wanting into something special. Wanting is everywhere just a matter of lacking something one needs. (shrink)

A number of philosophers endorse, without argument, the view that there’s something it’s like consciously to think that p, which is distinct from what it’s like consciously to think that q. This thesis, if true, would have important consequences for philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In this paper I offer an argument for it, and attempt to induce examples of it in the reader. The argument claims it would be impossible introspectively to distinguish conscious thoughts with respect to their (...) content if there weren’t something it’s like to think them. This argument is defended against several objections. Then I use what I call “minimal pair” experiences—sentences read without and with understanding—to induce in the reader an experience of the kind I claim exists. Further objections are considered and rebutted. (shrink)

A recurring claim in a number of behavioural, cognitive and neuro-scientific literatures is that there is, or must be, a unidimensional ‘common currency’ in which the values of different available options are represented. There is striking variety in the quantities or properties that have been proposed as determinants of the ordering in motivational strength. Among those seriously suggested are pain and pleasure, biological fitness, reward and reinforcement, and utility among economists, who have regimented the notion of utility in a variety (...) of ways, some of them incompatible. This topic deserves philosophical attention for at least the following reasons. Repeated invocation of the ‘common currency’ idiom isn’t merely terminological coincidence because most of the claims are competing explanations either of manifest pattern in choices, or of order in the processes producing choice. We can’t suppose that the different currency claims within each area are compatible, because there are significant obstacles to identifying pairs of members of either the ‘pattern’ or ‘process’ group. There are, finally, seriously opposed positions about the relationships between the pattern facts and the process facts. There are philosophical positions both favouring and opposing a common currency. But direct consideration of the abstract relationships between claims about common currencies across scientific settings, and the arguments for and against these claims, is relatively rare. There is, though, much of philosophical interest to be found here. (shrink)

Revisionary ontologies seem to go against our common sense convictions about which material objects exist. These views face the so-called Problem of Reasonableness: they have to explain why reasonable people don’t seem to accept the true ontology. Most approaches to this problem treat the mismatch between the ontological truth and ordinary belief as superficial or not even real. By contrast, I propose what I call the “uncompromising solution”. First, I argue that our beliefs about material objects were influenced by evolutionary (...) forces that were independent of the ontological truth. Second, I draw an analogy between the Problem of Reasonableness and the New Evil Demon Problem and argue that the revisionary ontologist can always find a positive epistemic status to characterize ordinary people’s beliefs about material objects. Finally, I address the worry that the evolutionary component of my story also threatens to undermine the best arguments for revisionary ontologies. (shrink)

A growing literature is premised on the claim that quantum mechanics provides evidence for metaphysical indeterminacy. But does it? None of the currently fashionable realist interpretations involve fundamental indeterminacy and the ‘standard interpretation’, to the extent that it can be made out, doesn't require indeterminacy either.

The essay explores the intersection of the Theory of Mind (T.O.M.) and Artificial Intelligence (AI), emphasizing the potential for AI to emulate cognitive processes fundamental to human social interactions. T.O.M., a concept crucial for understanding and interpreting human behavior through attributed mental states, contrasts with AI's behaviorist approach, which is rooted in data-driven pattern analysis and predictions. By examining foundational insights from cognitive sciences and the operational models of AI, this analysis highlights the potential advancements and implications of integrating T.O.M.-like (...) capabilities into AI systems. The discussion pivots around three critical questions: whether AI should emulate T.O.M. to enhance human interactions if AI can maintain its data-driven model while integrating cognitive processes, and how AI can expand its capabilities in social contexts. The arguments suggest that incorporating T.O.M.-like processes could significantly improve AI's interaction quality without compromising its analytical strengths, pointing towards a future where AI not only predicts but also empathizes, offering more nuanced and culturally aware interactions. This synthesis of cognitive theories and computational strategies advocates for deeper integration of diverse datasets and advanced computing methodologies, aiming to transform AI into a more empathetic and effective participant in human social environments. -/- Keywords: Theory of Mind, Artificial Intelligence, Human-AI Interaction, Cognitive Processes, Data-Driven Analysis. (shrink)

Heterogeneous treatment effects represent a major issue for medicine as they undermine reliable inference and clinical decision-making. To overcome the issue, the current vision of precision and personalized medicine acknowledges the need to control individual variability in response to treatment. In this paper, we argue that gene-treatment-environment interactions (G × T × E) undermine inferences about individual treatment effects from the results of both genomics-based methodologies—such as genome-wide association studies (GWAS) and genome-wide interaction studies (GWIS)—and randomized controlled trials (RCTs). Then, (...) we argue that N-of-1 trials can be a solution to overcome difficulties in handling individual variability in treatment response. Although this type of trial has been suggested as a promising strategy to assess individual treatment effects, it nonetheless has limitations that limit its use in everyday clinical practice. We analyze the existing variability within the designs of N-of-1 trials in terms of a continuum where each design prioritizes epistemic and pragmatic considerations. We then support wider use of the designs located at the pragmatic end of the explanatory-pragmatic continuum. (shrink)

Christian apologists, like Willian Lane Craig and Stephen T. Davis, argue that belief in Jesus’ resurrection is reasonable because it provides the best explanation of the available evidence. In this article, I refute that thesis. To do so, I lay out how the logic of inference to the best explanation (IBE) operates, including what good explanations must be and do by definition, and then apply IBE to the issue at hand. Multiple explanations—including (what I will call) The Resurrection Hypothesis, The (...) Lie Hypothesis, The Coma Hypothesis, The Imposter Hypothesis, and The Legend Hypothesis—will be considered. While I will not attempt to rank them all from worst to best, what I will reveal is how and why The Legend Hypothesis is unquestionably the best explanation, and The Resurrection Hypothesis is undeniably the worst. Consequently, not only is Craig and Davis’ conclusion mistaken, but belief in the literal resurrection of Jesus is irrational. In presenting this argument, I do not take myself to be breaking new ground; Robert Cavin and Carlos Colombetti have already presented a Bayesian refutation of Craig and Davis’ arguments. But I do take myself to be presenting an argument that the average person (and philosopher) can follow. It is my goal for the average person (and philosopher) to be able to clearly understand how and why the hypothesis “God supernaturally raised Jesus from the dead” fails utterly as an explanation of the evidence that Christian apologist cite for Jesus’ resurrection. (shrink)

Many philosophers embrace grounding, supposedly a central notion of metaphysics. Grounding is widely assumed to be irreflexive, but recently a number of authors have questioned this assumption: according to them, it is at least possible that some facts ground themselves. The primary purpose of this paper is to problematize the notion of self-grounding through the theoretical roles usually assigned to grounding. The literature typically characterizes grounding as at least playing two central theoretical roles: a structuring role and an explanatory role. (...) Once we carefully spell out what playing these roles includes, however, we find that any notion of grounding that isn’t irreflexive fails to play these roles when they are interpreted narrowly, and is redundant for playing them when they are interpreted more broadly. The upshot is that no useful notion of grounding can allow a fact to ground itself. (shrink)

We have a mentalistic view of objects. This is due to the interdependence of folk psychology and folk physics, where these are interconnected by what I call Teleological Commingling. When considering events that don’t involve agents, we naturally default to tracking intentions, goal-directed processes, despite the fact that agents aren’t involved. We have a deep-seated intentionality bias which is the result of the pervasive detection of agency cues, such as order or non-randomness. And this gives rise to the Agentive Worldview: (...) we view nature as a whole as being infused with agency and purpose. Teleological Commingling and the Agentive Worldview it gives rise to are at the core of our conception of objects. I maintain that the ordinary view of material objects is rooted in an implicit, false theory. It should be given no weight in metaphysical debates about the nature of material objects. And this problematizes the central methodological assumption that metaphysical theories of material objects should be beholden to common sense. (shrink)

According to some philosophers, a necessary condition of morally permissible punishment is that it communicates deserved censure for the offender’s wrongdoing. The author calls this the Communicative Condition of punishment. The chapter considers whether the use of mandatory crime-preventing neurointerventions is compatible with the Communicative Condition. The author argues that it is not. If we accept the Communicative Condition, it follows that it is impermissible to administer mandatory neurointerventions on offenders as punishment. The author then considers whether it is permissible (...) to offer an offender a neurointervention as a replacement for incarceration or in exchange for a shorter sentence. He notes that this could meet the Communicative Condition, although, somewhat oddly, only in cases where the neurointerventions have harmful effects. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop an account of the justification thinkers have for employing certain basic belief-forming methods. The guiding idea is inspired by Reichenbach's work on induction. There are certain projects in which thinkers are rationally required to engage. Thinkers are epistemically justified in employing any belief-forming method such that "if it doesn't work, nothing will" for successfully engaging in such a project. We present a detailed account based on this intuitive thought and address objections to it. We conclude (...) by commenting on the implications that our account may have for other important epistemological issues and debates. (shrink)

The idea that incompatibilism is intuitive is one of the key motivators for incompatibilism. Not surprisingly, then philosophers who defend incompatibilism often claim that incompatibilism is the natural, commonsense view about free will and moral responsibility (e.g., Pereboom 2001, Kane Journal of Philosophy 96:217–240 1999, Strawson 1986). And a number of recent studies find that people give apparently incompatibilist responses in vignette studies. When participants are presented with a description of a causal deterministic universe, they tend to deny that people (...) are morally responsible in that universe. Although this suggests that people are intuitive incompatibilists, Eddy Nahmias and Dylan Murray, in a recent series of important papers, have developed an important challenge to this interpretation. They argue that people confuse determinism with bypassing, the idea that one’s mental states lack causal efficacy. Murray and Nahmias present new experiments that seem to confirm the bypassing hypothesis. In this paper, we use structural equation modeling to re-examine the issue. We find support instead for an incompatibilist explanation of the bypassing results, i.e., incompatibilist judgments seem to cause bypassing judgments. We hypothesize that this phenomenon occurs because people think of decisions as essentially indeterministic; thus, when confronted with a description of determinism they tend to think that decisions do not even occur. We provide evidence for this in three subsequent studies which show that many participants deny that people make decisions in a deterministic universe; by contrast, most participants tend to allow that people add numbers in a deterministic universe. Together, these studies suggest that bypassing results don’t reflect a confusion, but rather the depth of the incompatibilist intuition. (shrink)

People suffering from severe monothematic delusions, such as Capgras, Fregoli, or Cotard patients, regularly assert extraordinary and unlikely things. For example, some say that their loved ones have been replaced by impostors. A popular view in philosophy and cognitive science is that such monothematic delusions aren't beliefs because they don't guide behaviour and affect in the way that beliefs do. Or, if they are beliefs, they are somehow anomalous, atypical, or marginal beliefs. We present evidence from five studies that folk (...) psychology unambiguously views monothematic delusions as stereotypical beliefs. This calls into question widespread assumptions in the professional literature about belief's stereotypical functional profile. We also show that folk psychology views delusional patients as holding contradictory beliefs. And we show that frequent assertion is a powerful cue to belief ascription, more powerful than even a robust and consistent track record of non-verbal behaviour. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to shed some light on a certain type of sentence, which I call a borderline contradiction. A borderline contradiction is a sentence of the form F a ∧ ¬F a, for some vague predicate F and some borderline case a of F , or a sentence equivalent to such a sentence. For example, if Jackie is a borderline case of ‘rich’, then ‘Jackie is rich and Jackie isn’t rich’ is a borderline contradiction. Many theories (...) of vague language have entailments about borderline contradictions; correctly describing the behavior of borderline contradictions is one of the many tasks facing anyone offering a theory of vague language. Here, I first briefly review claims made by various theorists about these borderline contradictions, attempting to draw out some predictions about the behavior of ordinary speakers. Second, I present an experiment intended to gather relevant data about the behavior of ordinary speakers. Finally, I discuss the experimental results in light of several different theories of vagueness, to see what explanations are available. My conclusions are necessarily tentative; I do not attempt to use the present experiment to demonstrate that any single theory is incontrovertibly true. Rather, I try to sketch the auxiliary hypotheses that would need to be conjoined to several extant theories of vague language to predict the present result, and offer some considerations regarding the plausibility of these various hypotheses. In the end, I conclude that two of the theories I consider are better-positioned to account for the observed data than are the others. But the field of logically-informed research on people’s actual responses to vague predicates is young; surely as more data come in we will learn a great deal more about which (if any) of these theories best accounts for the behavior of ordinary speakers. (shrink)